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Standards of Review and Scopes of Review in
Pennsylvania - Primer and Proposal
Jeffrey P Bauman*
"The wording of laws should mean the same thing to all men."1
Charles Louis De Montesquieu,
17t Century French Lawyer and Political Philosopher
INTRODUCTION
As Montesquieu suggests, a common understanding of the
wording of our laws is essential. Nowhere is this laudable goal of
universal understanding more needed than in the area of discerning
the meaning and application of standards of review and scopes of
review. Standards and scopes of review are integral and crucial
parts of the appellate process. 2 In Pennsylvania, consideration of
the standard of review and scope of review is mandatory, as an
appellant is required to set forth in his or her brief a statement of
both the standard of review and the scope of review.3 Yet the bar
continually struggles with what these terms mean, as well as with
ascertaining and applying the appropriate standard and scope of
review to a given issue on appeal.4
* Law Clerk for the Honorable Ralph J. Cappy, Justice, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
represent the opinions of Justice Cappy or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. I would like
to thank Justice Cappy for his unending support and encouragement. I am indebted to Betty
Minnotte, Deborah Cooper-Silvis, Julia Bums, Joy McNally, John Witherow, Professor Lu-in
Wang and especially Leslie Kozler for their thoughtful comments. Finally, I am grateful to my
wife Ellen Bauman, my children - Matthew and Maggie - and my parents for their patience,
support and love.
1. LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM 17 (1995).
2. See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REvIEw (1986)
[hereinafter CHILDRESS & DAVIS]; ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL (1996) [hereinafter ALDSEr].
3. See PARAP. 2111.
4. The author's observation as law clerk to Justice Ralph J. Cappy of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania is that a substantial portion of appellate briefs fail to articulate an
accurate standard of review and an even greater percentage of briefs are unsuccessful in
setting forth a distinct and meaningful scope of review. Moreover, the number of briefs
which fail to utilize even a stated standard and scope of review in their presentation of
argument is testimony to a lack of understanding of these vital concepts.
Duquesne Law Review
At the outset, it is necessary to introduce two concepts related to
the standard of review and the scope of review to clarify the focus
of this article. The appellate process has many different aspects
and the terms used to describe the various components of
appellate review have distinct meanings. Indeed, the term "review"
itself has been used to describe a number of differing concepts.
Review has been used to describe the limitations that are placed on
an appellate court as to what issues or types of decisions the court
may consider. Thus, an appellate court's review may be limited to
constitutional errors, errors of law, procedural errors and whether
the facts are supported by the substantial evidence of record.5 The
term review has been used to describe the legal analysis, or the
application of the rule of law, employed by a trial court, and later
by an appellate court on appeal, to resolve the merits of the
dispute at issue. This can be thought of as substantive review.
Review can also reflect the deference that an appellate court will
accord to a lower tribunal's determination. This has traditionally
been termed the "standard of review." Finally, the term review
might be used to describe the materials, or matters, that the
appellate court will review on appeal, and the light in which those
matters are viewed. As described more fully below, this article will
suggest that this aspect of appellate review be termed the "scope of
review."
While each of these concepts, along with others, form the mosaic
that is the appellate process,. this article deals directly with only
two aspects of that process. The focus of this article is on what
has been termed the standard of review, as well as the scope of
review. While an in-depth treatment is beyond the purview of this
article, the related concepts of limitation on review and substantive
review will be touched upon to more fully describe their interplay
with, and to understand, standards of review and scopes of review.
Having introduced these basic concepts which are essential to
meaningful discussion of standards and scopes of review, I tun to
the purpose and an overview of the article.
This article attempts to convey a greater meaning and
understanding to the terms and phrases used in describing
standards of review and scopes of review. The article will first
describe how the standards of review and scopes of review have
been defined as a general matter and their importance. It will
explore some of the difficulties inherent in ascertaining and
5. See 2 Pk CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (West 1995).
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applying a proper standard and scope of review. The article will
then analyze the attempts made by Pennsylvania courts to give
meaning to the terms standard of review and scope of review. An
effort to reconcile the guideposts offered by the judiciary in
Pennsylvania will be conducted and a proposal for more universal
definitions regarding standard and scope of review shall be offered.
Finally, different commonly used standards and scopes of review
will then be considered to give context to the proposed definitions.
It is hoped that this article will assist legal practitioners in their
appellate advocacy and law students in their preparation of
academic and legal materials, as well as the courts in addressing
this area of the appellate process.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a general proposition, a standard of review defines the
relationship and power allocation between dispute resolution
tribunals.6 It describes the degree of deference given by the
reviewing court to the action or decision of the lower tribunal. 7 In
this vein, a standard of review informs the appellate court of how
it must look at the trial court's decision when reviewing that trial
court's rulings on fact, law or discretionary matters.8 Stated
alternatively, a standard of review articulates "the positive authority
the appellate court wields in its review function."9 In essence, a
standard of review answers the question - how easily will a
reviewing court substitute its determination for that of the lower
court on a particular issue or ruling? However, viewed as authority,
it also describes the power of the lower tribunal, as it relates to the
reluctance of the reviewing tribunal to reverse the lower court's
decision.10
In metaphorical terms, the standard of review has been described
as the power of the "lens" through which the appellate court may
examine a particular issue in a case,' the "height of the hurdles
over which . . . appellants must leap" to prevail on appeal, 2 the
6. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 1-3.
7. See id. at 1-2.
8. See J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function: Scope of Review, 47
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 2, 1 (Spring 1984).
9. See CHILDRESS & DAvis, supra note 2, at 1-2.
10. See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APPELLATE PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 48 (2000).
11. See ALDISEr, supra note 2, at 57.
12. See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review - Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ.
L REV. 231, 232 (1991).
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"decibel level at which the appellate advocate [should] play to
catch the judicial ear,"13 and the "measuring stick" used by an
appellate court.' 4 Yet whether conjuring images of visual acuity,
physical prowess, aural reception or valuation, the standard of
review connotes, at its core, concepts of deference to, or power
over, a lower tribunal. Common standards of review, discussed
more fully below, are substantial evidence review, de novo review
and review for an abuse of discretion. Each of these terms have
been given specific meanings by courts and scholars, yet all import
varying degrees of deference that an appellate court will accord to
a lower tribunal's action.
1 5
An understanding of what is meant by a standard of review can
also be gleaned from what a standard of review is not. A standard
of review relates to the process of review, but does not speak to
the initial concept of appealability.16 Appealability addresses the
threshold concern of whether the appellate court can address the
issue at all. Often this appealability inquiry relates to whether a
trial court's order is final, whether a particular issue has been
properly preserved, or whether time requirements for appeal were
met.'7 It is simply premature to attempt to apply a standard of
review to an issue if the initial inquiry regarding appealability has
not been answered. If a decision or issue is not appealable, then
there is no question regarding the deferential standard to be
applied.' 8
Furthermore, although easily and often confused, a standard of
review is not a review of the merits of the legal issue before the
court, that is, a substantive standard. A substantive standard goes
to the burden a party must meet to prevail in a particular legal
context. It is the rule of law that a trial court applies to the
13. See Alvin B. Rubin, The Admiralty Case On Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA L
REV. 869, 873 (1983).
14. See John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes - Effective Advocacy on
Appeal, 30 Sw. U. 801, 810 (1976).
15. Childress and Davis offer that the standard of review also describes the relevant
and appropriate materials that the reviewing court reviews in performing its appellate
function. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 1-3. Thus, the standard of review may not only
state the level of deference, but may also include how materials are used in the reviewing
process. As discussed below, this article takes the position that, at least in Pennsylvania, the
scope of review is the term that describes the materials to be considered on appeal. Thus,
this related but alternative meaning of standard of review will be fully explored in the
context of the scope of review.




Standards and Scopes of Review
underlying dispute. A substantive standard, or a standard of proof,
does not speak to the relationship between courts or to the
deference to be accorded on review.19 An example clarifies the
distinction. The substantive standard regarding the granting of
summary judgment is well traveled. In Pennsylvania, a grant of
summary judgment is proper:
[W]henever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to
a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which
could be established by additional discovery or expert report,
or if after completion of discovery relevant to the motion,
including the production of expert reports, an adverse party
who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to
produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or
defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
submitted to a jury."20
This is the standard a trial court will use in undertaking its legal
analysis in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. However, the
standard of review to be applied by an appellate court to a decision
of a trial court granting summary judgment is related but distinct.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment by a trial court, "an
appellate court may disturb the order of the trial court only where
there has been an error of law or an abuse of discretion."2' Thus,
even though the reviewing court will apply the substantive standard
as part of its consideration of the legal issue, i.e., it will engage in
an analysis of whether genuine issues of material fact exist, it can
reverse only in light of its standard of review, i.e., when the trial
court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
22
In sum, standards of review can be viewed as describing the
relationship between appellate courts and lower tribunals. They
describe the deference accorded a lower court decision or the
degree of scrutiny used by a reviewing court in considering a trial
court determination. However, a standard of review is not a
talisman used to affirm or reverse a lower court ruling. The
meaning of a standard of review is ascertained only through
19. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L
REv. 469, 469-70 (1988).
20. See PAR.C.P. 1035.2.
21. See Albright v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 696 A2d 1159, 1165 (Pa. 1997).
22. As discussed more fully below, this statement as to the review of the trial court's
determination might even be better described as the type of decision under review rather
than the standard of review.
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consideration of the purpose and contours of the standard. As
stated by the leading scholars in this area, "standards of review
were never meant to be the end of the inquiry but a frame and a
limit on the substantive law."23
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW
As commonly used in legal opinions 4 and scholarship,25 the term
scope of review is synonymous with the concept of standard of
review. 26 Indeed, the terms are often used interchangeably. Thus, in
the vast majority of cases and literature, there is no practical
distinction between the two terms. However, some authors have
articulated possible distinctions between the terms and have
imparted a meaning other than that of a standard of review to
describe the term scope of review.
Specifically, the analysis regarding what issues an appellate court
should consider, even if certain formal prerequisites for appeal
have not been met, has been termed the scope of review. Scope of
review in this light underscores the tension between the
jurisprudential goals of conflict resolution and legal
pronouncement, on one side, and the vehicle used to achieve those
goals, i.e., specific trial court determinations that are otherwise not
proper for review, on the other.27 However, in this context,
consideration of the appropriate scope of review largely involves
matters of appealability. 8 As noted in the discussion of standard of
23. See STEVEN . CHmLDREss & MARTHA S. DAVIS, 1 FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.3, at
1-30 (1992). Professors Childress and Davis are unrivaled as the most prolific, and perhaps
influential, scholars that have delved into this area of the law. Their work has provided both
basic and in-depth understanding of these complex and difficult to apply concepts.
24. See, e.g., Hartman v. Baker, 2000 Pa. Super. 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
25. See, e.g., Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377
(1984).
26. See, e.g., CHILDRESS & DAvIS, supra note 2, at 1-18 ("Often this review-limitation
function [standard of review] is called scope of review. In a broad sense, standards of review
do define the visionary scope of the reviewers eye.").
27. See Phillips, supra note 9.
28. See id. In his discussion of scope of review, Judge Phillips considers scope of
review in the sense of an appellate court being able to address an issue when adherence to
formal requirements of appealability have not been met. Thus, considerations of non-final
orders, a change of theory on appeal, issue preservation before the lower tribunal, issue
development on appeal, and standing, all impact a court's decision of whether or not to
reach an issue, and, thus, define the scope of review. While these legal considerations
influence the appellate process, they are not considered to be part of the scope of review in
Pennsylvania. The desirability of reaching an issue, and the underlying consideration of
appeal requirements are addressed by appellate courts using their specific labels. See, e.g.,
Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114 (Pa 1974) (rejecting basic and
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review, appealability only tangentially relates to the manner in
which an appellate court reviews a lower court determination.
Similarly to standard of review, the term "scope of review" has
been described to mean limitations of review. This usage is most
common in administrative appeals where the legislature has limited
judicial review of agency determinations to particular matters. In
fact, this utilization of the term scope of review in this manner has
some basis in Pennsylvania law. However, even in this context of
reviewability, it is unclear as to what the scope of review, as stated
in both legislative 29 as well as constitutional30 enactments, clearly
refers.
In sum, as a general matter, the term scope of review has
traditionally been used interchangeably with standard of review.
However, certain other possible meanings of the term scope of
review, independent of standard of review, have also been
suggested. As more fully described below, this article proposes that
in Pennsylvania, the term scope of review, as it has been used and
as it has been suggested to be understood pursuant to Rule 2111, is
not synonymous with standard of review and does not contemplate
the above stated alternative understandings. After considering the
importance of standards and scopes of review, and the problems
encountered in attempting to relay a better understanding of these
terms, an in-depth analysis of the unique meanings of standard and
scope of review in Pennsylvania will be conducted. A proposal as
to the meanings and a uniform application of these terms will be
offered.
fundamental error theory of review and mandating timely and specific objection at trial).
29. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 703 (1995) (part of the Administrative Agency Law) entitled
"Scope of review" provides that a party before an agency shall not be precluded from
questioning the validity of a statute in the appeal, but that such party may not raise upon
appeal any other question not raised before the agency unless allowed by the court upon due
cause shown. This suggests that scope of review encompasses both the type of issue a party
may appeal and also the distinct concept of waiver. See also PAR.A.P. 1551.
30. See, for example, Article V, § 18(c)(2) of the Pennsylvania Constitution that
addresses the Judicial Conduct Board. "On appeal, the Supreme Court or special tribunal
shall review the record of the proceedings of the court as follows: on the law, the scope of
review is plenary; on the facts, the scope of review is clearly erroneous; and as to sanctions,
the scope of review is whether the sanctions imposed were lawful." Id. As evidenced by the
next sentence, the use of the term scope of review in this article of the Constitution utilizes
the term both interchangeably with standard of review as well as distinct therefrom. "The
Supreme Court or special tribunal may revise or reject an order of the court upon a
determination that the order did not sustain this standard of review; otherwise, the Supreme
Court or special tribunal shall affirm the order of the court." Id.
2001
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III. IMPORTANCE OF STANDARDS AND SCOPES OF REVIEW
The importance of the standard and scope of review cannot be
overemphasized. The appropriate standard and scope of review
should take center stage well before an appeal is filed. A trial must
be engaged in with at least an eye toward the unfortunate reality
that the party represented may lose and an appeal will become
necessary. The standard and scope of review for a particular issue
should shape how legal and evidentiary matters are approached at
trial and, to an extent, impact how the trial is conducted. Indeed,
the applicable standard of review, and, thus, the appropriate
deference given to lower court decisions must be a primary factor
in the initial decision of whether or not to appeal an adverse trial
decision, as that knowledge will assist in providing an indication of
success on appeal. 31
Knowledge and proper application of the appropriate standard of
review on appeal has been elevated by at least one scholarly jurist
to a question of minimum professional conduct,32 and for good
reason. The standard of review guides the court and, when
properly applied, can affect the outcome of the case for both
appellant and appellee.3 An appellant faces a much more onerous
struggle on appeal if the applicable standard of review is highly
deferential. Utilization of a standard that is highly deferential to the
lower tribunal favors the appellee, who can take some comfort in
knowing that the chance of reversal of the lower tribunal's decision
is slight. Conversely, an appellant's burden on an issue in which
little deference is given to the court below is eased at least to a
certain extent, and it is the appellee that is in greater jeopardy of
losing on appeal. Those advocates who present their arguments
utilizing an incorrect standard or scope of review may impose upon
themselves an unnecessarily difficult burden to overcome on
appeal, or may render themselves unprepared and unable to meet a
more deferential standard. Moreover, by failing to include a
31. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 1-24.
32. Ruggerio J. Aldisert, The Appellate Bar: Professional Responsibility and
Professional Competence - A View from the Jaundiced Eye of One Appellate Judge, 11 CAP.
U. L REV. 444 (1982). Judge Aldisert has been on the forefront of analysis and application of
standards of review. His contribution in this area has elevated what was largely an ignored
issue to a threshold consideration by appellate courts. Perhaps more importantly, his tireless
efforts have transformed what were once nebulous slogans into reviewing standards of real
meaning. Robert L Byer, Tribute to Ruggerio J. Aldisert: Judge Aldisert's Contribution to
Appellate Methodology: Emphasizing and Defining Standards of Review, 48 U. Prrr. L REv.
16 (1987).
33. See CHmLDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 2, at 1-13 & 1-14.
Vol. 39:513
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statement of the appropriate standard of review and scope of
review, an appellate advocate runs the risk of the appellate court
imposing an incorrect standard upon the appellate advocate, or
such a failure could lead to sanction, including dismissal of the
appeal.4 Conversely, an appellate advocate who is aware of and
utilizes the appropriate standard of review will not only improve
his or her chances of persuading the appellate court that the lower
tribunal erred, but will gain credibility through such knowledge and
advocacy.
Appellate courts also benefit from a clear and accurate statement
of the standard and scope of review. Courts consistently stating
and applying the appropriate standard and scope of review will not
only avoid erroneous decisions, but will build stability,
predictability, and credibility into the law of appeals. Moreover,
appellate courts will conserve scarce judicial resources if the
appropriate standard and scope of review are utilized. By adhering
to appropriate levels of deference, appellate courts will confirm
their status as courts of limited review, and thereby send a clear
message to the bar that not all matters should be appealed, further
aiding in the economy of judicial resources.
While recognition and utilization of the appropriate standard and
scope of review are important, these concepts are not easily
discerned or applied. The difficulties in this area can be attributed
to a number of factors. As discussed earlier, practitioners often
mistake the substantive standard to be applied to the legal issue for
the appropriate standard of review. While the substantive standard
will be a part of the appellate court's review, it is not the same as
the standard of review and does not describe the level of deference
that the lower tribunal decision should be accorded. Additionally,
appellate advocates use distinct terms such as scope of review and
standard of review interchangeably. 5 Different courts also use the
same term, such as scope of review, in different contexts. A single
34. PA.RAP. 2101.
35. See Morrison v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 646 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. 1994).
36. The term scope of review has been used to describe limitations on reviewability;
that is, the issues that a court may consider. See, e.g., Whitaker Borough v. Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Bd., 729 A.2d 1109, 1110 (Pa. 1999). It has also been used to describe the
level of deference to be accorded a lower court determination. See, e.g., Phillips v. A-Best
Prod. Co., 665 A2d 1167, 1170 (Pa. 1995). Finally, it has been used to describe the confines
of an appellate court's examination of an issue with respect to the reasons offered by a trial
court for its determination. See, e.g., Morrison, 646 A-2d at 570. This is not to suggest that
the court is incorrect in its statement of the legal tenet intended, but only to note its
potential for confusion regarding the use of a particular phrase.
2001
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term might even be used to describe two distinct concepts in the
same opinion.37 Each usage is not substantively incorrect, but
simply leads to confusion and misunderstanding.
Moreover, standards of review are not always identified by an
appellate court; thus, discernment of the appropriate standard of
review for a particular issue can become difficult. In addition,
courts at times cite to a standard of review in boilerplate fashion
but fail to give meaning in terms of application. Articulation of the
appropriate standard and scope of review is an ever-evolving
process, and the standard itself may be in a state of flux so that
knowledge of the appropriate standard is difficult to ascertain.
Thus, while the standard of review and scope of review are the
keystones of successful appellate advocacy and sound
jurisprudence, they are often misunderstood, de-emphasized or
ignored, by bar and bench alike, due to difficulties in ascertaining
their meaning and their appropriate application to a particular
issue.
IV. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW IN PENNSYLVANIA
Effective January 14, 1999, Rule 2111 of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Appellate Procedure requires all appellants' briefs to include a
statement of both the proper scope of review and the proper
standard of review. 38 As stated in relevant part:
(a) General Rule. The brief of the appellant, except as
otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the
following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in the
following order.
(1) Statement of Jurisdiction.
(2) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard of
review.
(3) Order or other determination in question.
(4) Statement of the questions involved.
(5) Statement of the case.
(6) Summary of argument.
(7) Argument for appellant.
37. See In re Hasay, 686 A-2d 809, 811 (Pa. 1996) (scope of review used to describe
both limitation of review and degree of deference).
38. PA-R.AP. 2111.
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(8) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(9) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivision (b)
and (c) of this rule.
39
The note to Rule 211140 is limited to a discussion of the newly
added requirement mandating a statement of the scope and
standard of review and refers specifically to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decision in Morrison v. Department of Public
Welfare:
The 1999 amendment requires a statement of the scope and
standard of review. "Scope of review" refers to "the confines
within which an appellate court must conduct its
examination." In other words, it refers to the matters (or
"what") the appellate court is permitted to examine. In
contrast, "standard of review" refers to the manner in which
(or "how") that examination is conducted. Morrison v. Dept. of
Pub. Welfare, 538 Pa. 122, 131, 646 A.2d 565, 570 (1994). This
amendment incorporates the prior practice of the Superior
Court pursuant to Pa.R.A.PE 3518 which required such
statements. Accordingly, rule 3518 has been rescinded as its
requirement is now subsumed under paragraph (a)(2) of this
Rule.41
While subsumed into the 1999 amendment, Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3518,42 which sets forth the prior. practice of
the Superior Court, and the comment thereto, acts as a second
reference point as to the meaning of scope and standard of review.
Rule 3518 stated:
(a) Brief of Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall include,
in addition to those matters enumerated in Rule 2111, a
statement of the scope and standard of review for each
contention. The statement shall be separately and distinctly
entitled and set forth following the statement of jurisdiction.
(b) Brief of the Appellee. The brief of the appellee may, but
need not, contain a statement of the scope and standard of
review for each contention as described in Subdivision (a).
Unless the appellee includes such a statement of the scope
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citation omitted).
42. PkR.AP. 3518 (rescinded 1999).
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and standard of review, it will be assumed that the appellee is
satisfied with the appellant's statement of the scope and
standard of review.4
The comment to rule 351844 gives additional aid in discerning the
difference between the scope and standard of review by
referencing the case of James P v. Children and Youth Services:
For a discussion of the distinction between scope of review
and standard of review, see James P v. Children and Youth
Services of Delaware County, 332 Pa. Super. 486, 481 A.2d 892
(1984) (Hofftan, J., concurring), rev'd, 511 Pa. 590, 515 A.2d
883 (1986).
45
Thus, a review of the terms scope of review and standard of review
as used in both Morrison and James P is necessary to glean the
meaning of these slippery concepts.
A. Morrison v. Department of Public Welfare
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Morrison sets
forth the most lucid statement of the meaning of scope and
standard of review in Pennsylvania.46 Morrison involved a wrongful
death action in which the trial court granted a new trial based
upon its determination that it erroneously permitted evidence and
argument regarding the conduct of one of the parties. 47 Specifically,
George Morrison was a mental health patient at Woodville State
Hospital. While on a home visit, Morrison began to hallucinate and
became violent. Shirley Morrison, the wife of George Morrison,
requested that her husband be returned to the hospital. The Office
of Mental Health arranged for the local Chief of Police to transport
Mr. Morrison to the police station and for Schleifer Ambulance
Service ("Schleifer") to transport Mr. Morrison to the hospital.
During Schleifer's transportation of Mr. Morrison to the hospital,
while the ambulance was crossing the Fort Pitt Bridge over the
Monongahela River, Mr. Morrison left the ambulance and fell over
the railing of the bridge to his death. 4




46. Morrison, 646 A.2d 565.
47. Id. at 567.
48. Id.
Vol. 39:513
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Schleifer as well as the Office of Mental Health and a Dr. Harika,49
alleging that their negligence caused the death of her husband.50
Before trial, Schleifer filed a motion in limine to preclude Mrs.
Morrison from admitting evidence that the ambulance crew failed
to remain at the scene of the fall. Schleifer argued that the
ambulance attendants' leaving the scene was not relevant to their
ability to assist Mr. Morrison because they could not have helped
him after his fall from the bridge.5' Mrs. Morrison countered that
the evidence of abandonment went to a lack of training on the part
of the crew and showed an ongoing course of negligent conduct.
The trial court denied Schleifer's motion.
52
At trial, numerous witnesses testified including the ambulance
attendants. Additionally, both parties offered expert testimony as to
local and national standards of care.5 The experts' opinions were
at odds as to training and transportation, as well as whether the
attendants had met acceptable standards when they left the scene
of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs.
Morrison and awarded her $450,000 in damages.-
The trial court granted Schleifer's motion for a new trial. The
court determined that it had engaged in "very serious trial error" in
permitting evidence and argument regarding the ambulance
attendants' conduct after the accident.5 The trial court limited its
reason for a new trial to this single evidentiary issue. On appeal, a
panel of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed. A
majority of the commonwealth court, in a 2-1 decision, framed the
issue as "whether the reason the trial court gave for granting a new
trial was in itself an error of law."5 6 Conversely, the dissent framed
the issue as whether the trial court abused its discretion. The
majority determined that abandonment evidence was relevant and
that the trial court's jury instruction cured any prejudice to
Schleifer as it instructed the jury that if Mr. Morrison died as a
result of the head injury, the ambulance crew's failure to remain at
the scene did not cause his death.57 Thus, the commonwealth court
49. Id. Morrison subsequently settled her action against the Office of Mental Health
and Dr. Harika. Id.
50. Id.
51. Morrison, 646 A.2d at 565.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 568.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 569.




reversed the trial court's grant of a new trial.
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Ralph J.
Cappy, writing for the court's majority, opined that the
commonwealth court's framing of the issue as whether the trial
court conunitted an error of law demonstrated a "basic
misunderstanding of the standard that is to be applied in reviewing
a trial court's decision to grant a new trial."5 The source of this
misunderstanding was confusion regarding the meaning of scope
and standard of review. Noting that the scope of review and the
standard of review were often and erroneously used
interchangeably, but that they were distinct concepts, the court
fust gave as a general statement what is the clearest articulation of
the scope and standard of review in Pennsylvania to date:59
"Scope of review" refers to "the confines within which an
appellate court must conduct its examination." Coker v. S.M.
Flickinger Company, Inc., 533 Pa. 441, 450 625 A.2d 1181,
1186 (1993). In other words, it refers to the matters (or
"what") the appellate court is permitted to examine. In
contrast, "standard of review" refers to the manner in which
(or "how") that examination is conducted. In Coker we also
referred to the standard of review as the "degree of scrutiny"
that is to be applied. Id., 625 A.2d at 1186.60
The court then undertook the task of considering these distinct
concepts in the context of the case before it.
Taking a macro view of the appeal, the court first recognized
that, at its core, the decision to order a new trial was one that was
within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, the standard of review
in considering whether a new trial was appropriate was ultimately
an abuse of discretion standard. The court determined that this
ultimate standard of review, or degree of scrutiny, did not vary. As
such, the ultimate question for a reviewing court in considering a
trial court's decision to grant a new trial was always whether the
trial court abused its discretion. 61
As to a general statement of the proper scope of review in
reviewing the decision to grant a new trial, the Morrison court
looked to the substance of the trial court decision. Unlike the
standard of review that was considered to be a constant, the court
58. Id.
59. Id. at 570.
60. Id.
61. Morrison, 646 A.2d at 570.
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stated that the scope of the appellate court's review of the trial
court's determination varies. If the trial court in granting a new trial
leaves open the possibility that reasons in addition to those given
might warrant a new trial, then the reviewing court's scope of
review is broad, and its review encompasses "examining the entire
record for any reason sufficient to justify a new trial."62 Conversely,
the court offered that if the trial court cited a finite set of reasons
for its decision, and that the reasons it provided are the only basis
for a new trial, then the appellate court is limited to an
examination of the stated reasons.63 This narrow scope of review
was deemed to be appropriate so that an appellate court could
perform its review function without improperly interfering with the
trial court's discretionary power to order a new trial.64 The primary
concern was to prevent an appellate court from ordering a retrial
where the trial court would not have done so. Thus, the reviewing
court's scope of review, at least in the context of the granting of a
new trial, varies and is defined by the trial court.6 5
The Morrison court then applied these more general
considerations of scope of review and standard of review to the
case before it. First, the supreme court dissected the trial court
opinion, breaking it into its components, then engaged in a
complex two-level analysis of that decision.6 6
The court explained that there were two parts to a trial court's
decision concerning whether to grant, or to deny, a new trial.
Initially, the trial court must discern whether a "mistake" was made
at trial. This first decision might involve consideration of factual,
legal or discretionary matters.67 Thereafter, the trial court must
make a second determination as to whether the mistake is
sufficient to form the underpinning of a grant of a new trial. This
second and ultimate decision is always discretionary as it involves
attention to the specific circumstances of the case.64
Having found that the trial court engaged in a bi-level
decision-making process, the supreme court then set forth a
corresponding two-level construct for appellate review. Initially, the
reviewing court examines the trial court's determination of mistake.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 570 n.5.
65. Id.





Both scope and standard must be considered at this threshold
level. First, if the trial court articulated a finite set of mistakes, as
was the case in Morrison, the appellate court's scope of review is
limited to those set reasons. 69 The reviewing court then considers
each particular reason under an appropriate standard. That is to
say that, although the ultimate standard of review to be applied is
that of abuse of discretion at this first level stage, when viewing
the "mistakes" relied upon by the trial court, differing standards of
review might be applicable depending upon the "mistake." If the
mistake involved a discretionary matter, the review would consider
an abuse of discretion. If the mistake involved a purely legal
matter,7' it would be reviewed as such.71 These standards might be
understood as sub-standards that are to be considered only at this
initial "mistake" stage. However, as discussed below, the ultimate
standard, which is applied at the second level of analysis when
determining whether a new trial should have been granted, remains
an abuse of discretion standard.
If the appellate court believed that the trial court erred in
determining that a mistake was made, the inquiry would end. There
would be no basis for the granting of a new trial, and the reviewing
court would reverse. 72 Conversely, if the appellate court found that
the trial court neither abused its discretion or committed an error
of law in finding that mistakes occurred, then it would proceed to
the second level of analysis.
At the second level of analysis, the reviewing court considers the
decision to grant a new trial using an abuse of discretion
standard. 3 In conducting this review, the appellate court addresses
whether the trial court's stated reasons and factual basis for the
granting of a new trial were supported by the record. In
considering whether the record supported the trial court's decision,
69. Id.
70. As discussed below, the generally articulated standard of review applicable to
questions of law has been stated as de novo review. De novo means "anew" or "fresh."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). In the context of appellate review, it even more
precisely connotes no deference. However, in Pennsylvania, the standard of review with
respect to errors of law has not been uniformly stated. Most recently, the term "plenary" has
been utilized (although described as the scope of review). Plenary is akin to de novo and
commonly means "complete" or "unqualified." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1154 (6th ed. 1990). As
proposed below, de novo review, or as has been more commonly used in Pennsylvania,
plenary review, would be the appropriate description of the standard of review for errors of
law.
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the appellate court defers to the determination of the trial court
and reverses only if the judgment was, inter alia, manifestly
unreasonable or a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.74 If
none of these factors is present and if support for the lower court's
decision is found in the record, there is no abuse of discretion.
Applying this construct to the facts of the case, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ultimately found that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding a new trial.75 Initially, the court reviewed
the trial court's level one inquiry of determining whether a mistake
had been made. As the trial court offered a single reason for the
new trial - that the evidence of post-accident conduct should have
been excluded - the reviewing court's scope of review was
narrow, i.e., limited to that reason. The supreme court determined
that the admission of evidence lies within the discretion of the trial
court and, therefore, applied an abuse of discretion standard as the
sub-standard of review. Finding that the court did not abuse its
discretion with respect to determining that a mistake had occurred,
it then engaged in the second level of review and considered
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial.
Based upon a review of the record, the supreme court opined that
the record supported the trial court's reasoning that the
post-accident evidence was the focus at trial and that such
evidence was prejudicial to Schleifer.7 6 As the trial court's stated
reasons for granting a new trial were supported by the record, and
because the trial court was found to be in the best position to
consider the impact of the post-accident conduct evidence on the
jury, the supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in granting a new trial.
77
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Morrison is its
most comprehensive attempt to define scope of review and
standard of review. Morrison clearly instructs that the standard of
review is the "manner" in which the reviewing court examines a
lower tribunal's decision.78 It is how the examination is conducted
and sets forth the "degree of scrutiny" that the appellate court is to
apply.79 In the case of the review of the granting of a new trial, a
discretionary act, the standard of review is ultimately an abuse of
74. Id. at 571-72.
75. Id. at 572.
76. Morrison, 646 A.2d at 572.
77. Id. at 573.





The Morrison court also left no doubt that the scope of review
represents the "matters" or "what" a reviewing court is permitted to
consider when examining the lower tribunal's determination.81 It is
the "confines" within which the reviewing court examines the
decision below.8 2 In the context of the consideration of the granting
of a new trial, the scope of review varies, depending upon the
reasons articulated by the trial court for its decision.83 The
Morrison court used the terms "narrow" and "broad" to describe
the scope of review. A narrow scope of review would apply where
the reasons offered by the trial court are finite. A reviewing court,
under this narrow scope of review, would be limited to a review of
those set reasons given by the trial court. Conversely, a broad
scope of review would be applicable to those determinations in
which the trial court may give certain reasons for its decision but
leaves open the possibility of other reasons for its granting of a
new trial.
The teachings of Morrison with respect to the standard of review
can be easily applied to other situations. Its definition of standard
of review is in accord with other generally accepted definitions of
the concept. However, guidance in other situations with respect to
the scope of review is not self-evident as that decision arose in the
context of the granting of a new trial. Thus, it is valuable to turn to
the second guidepost offered by Pa.R.A.P. 2111 - the reference to
former Rule 3518 - to consider whether it offers further aid.
B. James P. v. Children and Youth Services
Like Rule 2111, former Rule 3518 required a statement of the
scope and standard of review.84 The text of the rule offered no
insight into the meaning of the terms. However, the Comment to
the Rule cited Judge Hoffman's concurring opinion in James P. for
a "discussion" as to the distinction between the scope and standard
of review.85 While the opinions in James P make clear that scope
of review and standard of review are amorphous concepts, Judge
Hoffman's concurring opinion offers a second view of what
constitutes the scope of review. To fully understand Judge
80. Id.
81. spn]Morrison, 646 A2d at 572.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. PkR.A.P. 3518 (rescinded 1999).
85. Id.
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Hoffman's view of standard and scope of review, a review of the
majority's definition of those terms is required.
James P dealt with the issue of termination of parental rights.
86
Appellant James P and Marie J. were the natural parents of James
J. Marie J. was committed to Haverford State Hospital, and, as a
result, James J. was placed in the custody of Children and Youth
Services of Delaware County ("CYS"). Marie J.'s parental rights
were subsequently terminated. Thereafter, CYS filed a petition to
terminate James P's parental rights.8 7 After a hearing, the trial court
ordered that James P's rights be terminated as well.88 On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed. The majority opinion for
the superior court sitting en banc set forth the standard of review
as a determination of whether the trial court's termination of
parental rights was supported by competent evidence.
8 9
Furthermore, unless the court abused its discretion or committed
an error of law, the findings of the trial court were to be given the
same weight as a jury verdict.90
The court went on to determine that the scope of review would
relate to "the appellate court's duty to ensure that the trial court
has satisfactorily fulfilled the requirements of examining all
evidentiary resources, conducting a full hearing and setting forth its
decision in a full discursive opinion."91 Noting that a broad or
searching scope of review does not permit an appellate court to
make an independent determination of fact, but does not preclude
a reviewing court from using abuse of discretion as the appropriate
standard of review, the court spoke of the scope of review in terms
of due process:
The purpose of employing broad and searching review is for
the protection of the parties in ensuring that the inquiry of the
lower court is complete and that its decision was made in
accordance with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in protecting the fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in their child.92
The court majority went on to note that the purpose of the
86. James P, 481 A.2d at 892.
87. Id. at 893.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 894.
90. Id.
91. James P, 481 A.2d at 894.
92. Id. at 895.
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utilization of an abuse of discretion standard of review was to
accord the fact finder the appropriate deference because that trier
had the opportunity to observe witnesses and to evaluate their
testimony.9 3 However, while the majority clearly drew a distinction
between scope and standard of review, it unfortunately closed its
discussion of these concepts by lapsing back into the morass by
confusing the two terms. The court stated, "[tiherefore, we reject
appellant's contention that the holding in Santosky mandates a
broader scope of review than abuse of discretion."
94
Enter Judge Hoffman. In his concurrence, Judge Hoffman
attempts to clarify the distinction between scope and standard of
review. Initially, the judge agreed with the majority that the
purpose of a scope of review is to ensure that the trial court has
examined all the evidence, provided a full hearing, and set forth a
meaningful opinion.95 However, Judge Hoffman further offered a
description of the scope of review as it relates to a comprehensive
review of the record. Judge Hoffman stated that "[i]n other words,
in reviewing a termination of parental rights order, our Court must
consider all of the evidence before the lower court as well as the
lower court's findings of fact and conclusions of law." 96
Judge Hoffman went on to find that the breadth of the scope of
review does not translate into a correspondingly broad standard of
review. Judge Hoffman defined a standard of review as the
appellate court's ability, or the limits on its ability, "to modify or
reverse the action taken by the lower court."97 The judge concluded
that an abuse of discretion standard requires a broad
comprehensive view of the entire record to determine whether the
lower court abused its discretion. Unless, after such a broad review
of the entire record, the reviewing court found that the lower court
abused its discretion, the decision by that lower tribunal must be
affirmed.
Thus, while both the majority and the concurrence in James P.
speak in terms of the scope of review and the standard of review,
only Judge Hoffman unambiguously draws a distinction between
the two. In doing so, Judge Hoffman, like the majority, states the
standard of review in terms of deference. Judge Hoffman, agreeing
with the majority, casts the scope of review in terms of due
93. Id.
94. Id. at 896.
95. Id. at 900.
96. James P, 481 A-2d at 900.
97. Id.
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process. Review of the trial court's obligation to review the
evidence, to allow a full hearing, and to articulate the reasons for
its determination, is the duty of the appellate court pursuant to its
scope of review. The appellate court is to be a watchdog, ensuring
that the lower tribunal has, in essence, done its job. While much of
the discussion regarding scope of review focuses on these due
process concerns, a closer look at the concurrence reveals that it
also speaks to "what" the appellate tribunal is to consider on
review. In the context of a broad scope of review, the court must
consider the entire record before the lower court as well as the
findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining whether the
lower tribunal abused its discretion.
C. Reconciliation of Morrison and James P.
Rule 2111 offers the express guidepost of Morrison, and the
"subsumed" guidepost of James P, to assist appellate advocates in
providing the court with the appropriate standard and scope of
review. Indeed, the Morrison court's definitions have greatly
enlightened all discussions of the meaning of the scope and
standard of review as those terms are used in Pennsylvania.
However, even with Morrison's discussion of the meaning of scope
and standard of review, uncertainty remains. The continuing failure
of many advocates to articulate the appropriate scope and standard
of review suggests that further analysis of the meaning of scope of
review and standard of review, as described in Morrison as well as
in James P., is required.
As there appears to be greater consensus with respect to
standard of review, that concept will be addressed first. Morrison's
articulation that the standard of review is the manner of
examination, or how the lower tribunal decision is examined, and
its reference to the "degree of scrutiny" that is to be applied by an
appellate court, fit comfortably within the traditional understanding
of the standard of review discussed above. At their core, these
definitions are ways of describing the authority over the lower
court decision by the reviewing tribunal. Morrison speaks to the
type of review, adopting the abuse of discretion test in the context
of the granting of a new trial and also noting that the
commonwealth court's standard that is applicable to pure errors of
law is de novo. Similarly, Judge Hoffman's concurrence in James P
looks at the deference to be given by the reviewing court when
examining the decision below. Specifically, the concurrence speaks
of the limits on the appellate court's ability to modify or reverse
2001
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the decision of the lower court. Unless the lower court abused its
discretion, the appellate court may not alter the lower court's
decision.
98
The definition suggested in Morrison, with its emphasis on
authority, simply suggests the flip side of the language in James P
emphasizing the deference to which a lower tribunal is entitled.
Thus, conceptually, the standard of review as described in
Morrison is easily reconciled with that offered in James P
Moreover, these definitions transcend the legal settings in which
the two cases arose, that of a new trial in Morrison and the
termination of parental rights in James P
The point at which the guideposts converge is not as obvious
when attempting to understand the meaning of the scope of review.
Indeed, the definition of scope of review as articulated in Morrison
cannot easily be compared to that offered by Judge Hoffman in his
concurrence in James P This makes it difficult to be certain of the
meaning of scope of review beyond the specific context in which
the term is defined. While at first blush the definitions appear to be
difficult to harmonize, a comparison of the two reveals some
common ground and a basis that may lead to a more universal
definition of scope of review.
In Morrison, the court's focus was on the matters (or "what") the
reviewing court "was permitted to examine." The phrase addressed
the confines of appellate review. This language also connotes
deference or limitation. Yet, in applying that term, the court keyed
on the meaning of the term in the context of the reasons offered
by the trial court for its ultimate determination and whether they
were finite or whether there existed the possibility of other
potential reasons for the court's decision. Conversely, Judge
Hoffman in James P suggested that the scope of review did not go
to the substance of the review, but, rather, to the consideration of
the lower court's conduct. This understanding of scope of review is
concerned with ensuring that the lower court performed in accord
with due process.
Nevertheless, the description of the term scope of review as
offered in Morrison, as well as that penned by Judge Hoffman in
his concurrence in James P, intersect in at least one significant
way. In both decisions the phrase scope of review is given meaning
by reference to varying degrees of review of the record. In
Morrison, the definition speaks to "what" the appellate court is
98. Id.
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permitted to examine. In discussing the situation in which a trial
court allows for reasons other than those stated to support the
award of a new trial, the Morrison court found that the appellate
court is guided by a broad scope of review that permits it to
examine "the entire record for any reason sufficient to justify a
new trial."
Likewise and in even clearer terms, in his concurrence in James
P, Judge Hoffman suggests that in fulfilling its duty to ensure that
the trial court examined the record, conducted a satisfactory
hearing, and set forth an opinion pregnant with meaning under a
broad scope of review, the reviewing court is required to "conduct
a comprehensive review of the record formulated in" the lower
court. Stated another way, under such a scope of review, an
appellate court must consider "all of the evidence before the lower
court" as well as the trial court's finding of facts and conclusions of
law. The review is to be of "the entire record." Thus, while
seemingly expressing divergent views of what constitutes the scope
of review, Morrison and James P share some commonality.
D. Clarification of Definitions
The difficulty with citation to the guideposts offered by Rule
2111 is that they are handicapped by the nature of the source of
example. By using opinions to offer guidance, the definitions that
can be gleaned from those opinions are necessarily limited by the
context of the appeal in which the definition arose. The fact that
more comprehensive and wider ranging definitions are not offered
is not a failure on the part of the appellate court. Indeed, it would
be jurisprudentially unsound for a court to offer an opinion
containing far reaching definitions of scope of review and standard
of review that would speak to legal issues not in the case. It would
transform the opinion into a law review article. However, not being
bound by such jurisprudential constraints, we have in this forum
the luxury of being able to attempt to arrive at some common
meanings of the terms and the ability to give examples outside of a
limited context to demonstrate how those definitions may be
applied. Thus, perhaps even clearer definitions of standard of
review and scope of review can be articulated that are consistent
with the guideposts offered in Morrison and James P, but which
transcend the circumscribed issues in those cases and give broader
meaning and application to these ioncepts, and, as a result, offer
additional guidance to the bar.
As to a proposed standard of review, the definitions offered in
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Morrison and James P are in accord with generally used
definitions and have the desirable quality of broad application.
Consistent with both cases, as well as the general understanding of
a standard of review, an appellate court's standard of review can be
defined as the degree of deference or scrutiny that an appellate
court will use in reviewing a lower tribunal's determination. That is
to say, it is the manner in which an appellate court reviews the
action or decision of a lower tribunal. As will be discussed below,
the types of standards of review can be defined using the terms
that have been traditionally utilized: de novo review, substantial
evidence review, or review for abuse of discretion.
Considering the differing contexts in which the phrase scope of
review has been defined, formulating a proposed definition of
scope of review that is consistent with Morrison and James P, yet
one that transcends the limited circumstances of those cases and is
susceptible to broader application, is much more difficult. A farther
reaching definition would neither be limited to consideration of the
finite or infinite reasons offered by a trial court for its decision, nor
have at its core considerations of due process. Rather, a more
universal definition of scope of review would focus on the common
ground of review of the record developed at the trial court level.
Scope of review in this broader context can be defined as "what"
the appellate court is permitted to examine when reviewing the
action or decision of a lower tribunal. Depending upon the
particular legal issue involved, the scope may include the reasoning
given by the lower tribunal; but, generally, the scope of review
defines what materials, i.e., what part of the record, the appellate
tribunal may consider and use in performing its review function.
Related thereto, scope of review would also include the
utilization or the emphasis to be given to those materials in that
reviewing process.9 In most cases, the scope of review will be
described as broad, connoting a use of the entire record. In certain
limited situations, it will be described as narrow or limited. In
those instances, only certain aspects of the record may be utilized
99. While this article suggests that the scope of review in Pennsylvania speaks to the
reasons offered by a lower tribunal for its determination, as well as the materials that a
court may consider in reviewing the decision of a lower tribunal, it must be recognized that
the concept of what materials are to be reviewed has been considered by some to be part of
the standard of review. See CMDRESS & DAviS, supra note 2, at 1-17. Needless to say, this
area of the law is fraught with semantical difficulties. Thus, in light of the unique description
of the scope of review articulated in Morrison and James P, in Pennsylvania, at least,
consideration of what materials are to be used by the reviewing court on appeal is better
placed under the banner of scope of review than of standard of review.
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and that evidence might be viewed in a manner that favors a
particular party.
This conception of the scope of review is entirely consistent with
Morrison's definition of "what" the appellate court is permitted to
examine in resolving the issue before the court. Furthermore, it is
in accord with James P's mandate that, in applying the appropriate
standard of review (in that case, whether the trial court abused its
discretion), the reviewing court must consider the entire record of
the court below. While consistent with these guideposts, this
defimition also transcends the limited context in which the term
scope of review was analyzed.
Support for this more extensive definition of the scope of review
can be found in at least two decisions rendered by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania. In Peak v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review,( ° the court spoke to the appropriate standard of
review under the Administrative Agency Law. 101 Adopting the
standard of review as stated in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Universal Camera v. NLRB,102 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania determined that the standard of judicial review of an
administrative agency's factual determination was substantial
evidence on the record. 10 3 Although not expressly stating the
concept in terms of scope of review, the court found that a
reviewing court was required to review the entire record, including
that evidence which was contrary to the administrative agency's
determination. °4 Thus, in post-Morrison terms, the scope of review
focused on "what" the appellate court is to consider in making its
review of the lower tribunal action. 0 5
100. 501 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1985).
101. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704 (1995).
102. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
103. Peak, 501 A2d at 1387.
104. Id.
105. This understanding of scope of review served as the foundation of a concurrence
in the subsequent case of Bowman v. Department of Environmental Resources, 700 A.2d 427
(Pa. 1997). In that case, the Pennsylvania high court grappled with the issue of whether the
commonwealth court exceeded its "scope of review" in reviewing the decision of the
Department of Environmental Resources in filling a position under the Civil Service Act. In
reviewing the determination of the Civil Service Commission that a park ranger position had
been filled improperly, the commonwealth court reversed the Commission decision, on the
basis that the record did not contain substantial evidence to support the Commission's
findings. On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the majority found that the
Commonwealth had reweighed the facts of the case and that there existed substantial
evidence in support of the Commission's determination. Justice Cappy, joined by Justice
Castille, opined that the majority relied upon a single substantive item of evidence to support
the Commission's decision rather than applying the "appropriate" review which required the
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More recently, in Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. WCAB (Minteer),"1°
the court addressed the issue of whether a claimant of workers'
compensation benefits, Clarence Minteer, was an employee or an
independent contractor for purposes of the Workers' Compensation
Act. The court first explained that the determination of the
existence of an employer/employee relationship was a question of
law and based upon the unique facts in the case. The court stated
that, because the appeal dealt with a question of law, the scope of
review was plenary. In doing so, the court further described this
scope of review as broad. The court then noted that a reviewing
court was to examine the entire record made before the workers'
compensation judge, including the evidence that detracted from the
agency's decision.107 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
support for such a review in the Administrative Agency Law that
provides that an appellate court "shall hear the appeal without a
jury on the record certified by the Commonwealth agency."' °s Thus,
the court implicitly, if not expressly, recognized a scope of review
contemplated in this article - what, in terms of the record, the
reviewing court was permitted to use in determining whether an
error of law had been committed by the lower tribunal.
Yet support for the definition offered in this article is not
confined to administrative agency determinations. Consideration of
a final case sharpens the point. A prime example of the usage of
the scope of review as envisioned in this article is found in the
context of review of a court's determination regarding the
suppression of evidence. In ex rel. D.M.,' °9 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated that, when reviewing the rulings of a
suppression court, the appellate court "must consider only the
evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the
record as a whole."110 Thus, as described in this article, the scope
of the court's review is narrow or limited in this context. Although
not expressly stated as a scope of review, this concept of what the
court to review the entire record including evidence that subtracted from the agency's
decision. Id. (citing Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501 A.2d 1383 (Pa
1985)). Thus, the concurrence suggested a broad scope of review even without describing it
as such.
106. 762 A.2d 328 (Pa. 2000).
107. Id. at 331 (citing Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501 A.2d
1383, 1387 (Pa. 1985)).
108. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704 (1995).
109. 727 A-2d 556 (Pa. 1999).
110. Id. at 557.
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reviewing court may consider and how it is to be considered is
consistent with the definition of scope of review suggested in this
article."'
One final concept must be addressed with respect to the
meaning of scope of review as that term is used in Pennsylvania.
Scope of review in Pennsylvania has been regularly used to
describe the limitation of issues that the judiciary may review with
respect to administrative agency decisions. As courts have no
general supervisory power over administrative agencies, legislative
enactments have circumscribed review of a final administrative
order to certain issues. In Pennsylvania, the Administrative Agency
Law limits review of a final order by an administrative agency to
whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether an error
of law has been committed, whether there has been a violation of
the practice or procedure of the administrative agency, and
whether the findings of fact made by the agency are supported by
substantial evidence." 2 Thus, the law limits reviewability to certain
types of issues.
This limitation on the issues or types of decisions that an
appellate court may consider in reviewing the actions of an
administrative agency has been phrased as the standard of review"
3
and as the scope of review." 4 While such a statement of limitation
can be shoehorned into the definition of scope or standard of
review, neither of these terms, as they are contemplated above,
truly embrace this concept of limitation on reviewability. Rather,
both the standard of review and the scope of review, at least as
used in Morrison and James P., presume an issue already properly
before the appellate court, and do not contemplate reviewability of
111. The standard of review with respect to a trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress evidence has been stated as whether the factual findings made by the court "are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct." Id. Where the record supports the findings of fact made by the suppression court,
the appellate court is bound by them and the reviewing court "may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error." Id. Thus, the standard of review, as stated in
D.M., clearly envisions the level of deference to be accorded the lower court in its
determination regarding suppression of evidence. Numerous other examples exist where an
appellate court's view of the matters or how the matters are to be viewed are limited
resulting in a narrow scope of review. For instance, in reviewing a claim based upon the
sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa. 1991).
112. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. § 704 (1995).
113. See, e.g., Cook v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 671 A.2d 1130 (Pa.
1996).
114. See, e.g., Lehigh County Vo-Tech School v. WCAB, 652 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1995).
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the issue in the first instance. More specifically, the standard of
review contemplates the manner of review of a lower tribunal's
determination as to a particular decision.1 5 Scope of review, as
used in both Morrison and James P, addresses "what" a court may
consider, whether it be the reasons offered by the lower tribunal in
support of its resolution of an issue or the breadth of the record
utilized in reviewing that particular issue.
One option for the bar and for courts would be to continue to
describe the limitations on the reviewability of certain types of
issues in the administrative context as scopes or standards of
review, as is currently the practice. An attempt could be made to
note the distinction between the initial threshold "scope" of review
and the later examination scope of review." 6 However, if clarity
and lack of confusion are goals, this option is simply unsatisfactory.
Alternatively, if neither standard of review nor scope of review,
as contemplated in Morrison or James P, describe limitations on
the types of issues permitted to be reviewed on appeal of an
administrative agency decision, and it is desirable to limit the use
of those terms to their intended meaning, then alternative verbiage
must be suggested to avoid the confusion caused by using the same
terms to describe two distinct concepts. A solution to this dilemma
would be to speak of the types of issues that a court is able to
review in the administrative context simply in generic terms of
limitations without ascribing to the concept the label of either
115. For example, in Morrison, the court explained its application of the standard of
review. The court looked to the reason offered by the trial court for granting a new trial and
determined that if the trial court's stated reason was based upon a discretionary matter, then
the matter must be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Morrison, 646 A.2d at 571.
Conversely, if the reason offered by the trial court raised purely a question of law (such as
inaccurate jury instructions), it would be reviewed as such. Id. Although the Morrison court
did not further describe this review of a question of law, it can be surmised, based upon
other case law, that the review would be what is commonly described as de novo or plenary.
116. Under this scenario, a hypothetical statement of the scope and standard of review
can be envisioned as follows: "In reviewing the detenination of the Workers' Compensation
Appeal Board, this court's scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional
rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed, Board procedures have been
violated, and whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. As
the issue in this case is whether the claimant established abnormal working conditions, the
appellant raises a question of law. The standard of review with respect to a question of law
is de novo. The scope of review regarding this issue is broad." As can easily be determined,
the use of the term scope of review to mean two distinct concepts is unsatisfactory as that
term is now a term of art. Further confusing the matter is that the term scope of review has
been used to describe the standard of review. Thus, in a single context, the "scope of
review" might describe both the limitations on what issues the appellate court may consider
as well as the standard to be utilized when examining the particular issue on appeal.
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scope of review or standard of review."7 By keeping the concept of
the limitation of issues that an appellate court can review on
appeal distinct from the manner and materials or reasoning to be
reviewed, clarity is achieved and the integrity of the meanings of
scope of review and standard of review is maintained.
Thus, this article proposes a two level, and possibly a three level
statement, as to the appropriate standard of review and scope of
review for each issue raised on appeal. First, the advocate may
describe the limitation on the court as to the types of issues that it
can review. Second, the party must defme the issue and give the
proper standard of review. Finally, the litigant should set forth the
proper scope of review. Such a statement may be expressed as
follows:
Appellate review in workers' compensation proceedings is
limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been
violated, an error of law has been committed, or Board
procedures have been violated, and whether the necessary
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. The
issue presently before the court involves an assertion that the
appeal board committed an error of law in determining that
the claimant has been exposed to abnormal working
conditions. The standard of review as to determinations of law
is de novo. The scope of review is broad. That is, the court
may review the entire record in considering the decision of
the appeal board.
E. Amendment of Rule 2111
Before turning to consider some of the more common
applications of the definitions of standard of review and scope of
review to give some context to these terms, two final proposals
regarding Rule 2111 are offered. As noted above, Rule 2111 simply
requires a statement of the scope and standard of review.
18
Moreover, the Rule speaks to inclusion of these concepts only in
117. Under this scenario, a hypothetical statement of the limitations on court review
might be drafted as follows: "Appellate review in workers' compensation proceedings is
limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has
been committed, Board procedures have been violated, and whether necessary findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence." The statement would then set forth the




the appellant's brief.119 For the bar and the bench to gain maximum
benefit from an increased understanding and usage of the concepts
of standard of review and scope of review, Rule 2111 should be
expanded in two ways.
First, to ensure that both the bar and the bench benefit from
consideration of these concepts to their fullest extent, the
requirement that the scope of review and the standard of review be
stated should be mandated for each issue raised on appeal. That is
to say, if the appeal raises more than one type of issue, a statement
of both the standard and scope of review for each point should be
required. This modification to the Rule would simply set forth in
express terms that which is arguably already incorporated from
former Rule 3518, which required a statement of the scope and
standard of review "for each contention."120 Requiring such a
statement for each issue raised on appeal would also be consistent
with the federal rules of appellate procedure.121 Mandating a
statement of the scope of review and the standard of review for
each issue will ensure that both the bar and the bench are
equipped with what is necessary to engage in a full analysis of each
issue.
Second, Rule 2111 should be expanded to clarify appellee's
concerns, if necessary, regarding the scope and standard of review.
Again, former Rule 3518 expressly indicated that the appellee's
brief, may, but need not, contain a statement of these concepts.'
21
Moreover, pursuant to former Rule 3518, unless the appellee
included such a statement of the scope and standard of review, it
was assumed that the appellee adopted appellant's statement of the
standard and scope of review.1 2 Modification of Rule 2111 to
expressly address appellee's opportunity to supply, clarify or
correct the appropriate standard and scope of review for each
point will clear any ambiguity as to appellee's role, or the
119. Id.
120. Pa.R.AP. 3518 (rescinded 1999).
121. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a), in pertinent part, states:
The appellant's brief must contain...
(9) The argument... must contain: (B) For each issue, a concise statement of the
applicable standard of review (which may appear in the discussion of each issue or
under a separate heading placed before the discussion of the issues) ....
FED. R. App. P. 28(a).
121. PKR.AP. 3518 (rescinded 1999).
123. Id.
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consequences for failing to act, in the briefing process. 124
Commentary on appellee's brief would also be in accord with the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 125 Not only will the appellee
have the express opportunity to participate in the formulation of
the scope and standard of review, but such additional input will aid
in the advocacy and resolution of the issues before the court.
V. APPLICATIONS OF STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND SCOPES OF REviEw
Having set forth proposed definitions of standard of review and
scope of review, it is beneficial to consider some of the types of
decisions rendered by courts and the more widely used standards
and scopes of review that have been applied in Pennsylvania, or
may be applied, to these decisions. The appropriate standard
typically depends upon a number of factors. To ascertain and apply
the appropriate standard and scope of review, generally two basic
inquiries must be made. First, what type of issue or decision is
being reviewed? For purposes of this article, three principal types
of issues or decisions will be considered: review of fact, review of
law, and review of discretion. 26 The second question is what body
or tribunal made the decision being reviewed? For each type of
decision, the discussion will include, where applicable, the differing




124. The obvious danger in failing to set forth the appropriate scope and standard of
review as an appellee is the possibility of being saddled with an inaccurate or inappropriate
scope or standard that is to an appellee's disadvantage. See PA-RAP. 302. A failure to set
forth the appropriate standard amounts to a waiver of the issue. See id.
125. FED. R. APP. P. 28(b).
126. It must be recognized that distinguishing between fact and law is fraught with
difficulty. This confusion is compounded when the hybrids of mixed questions of law and
fact and discretionary matters are considered. As the purpose of this article is to provide a
basic overview of concepts and to offer some common definitions in this semantical game of
tag, a discussion on how to discern the differences between fact, law, mixed questions of
fact, and discretionary decisions is beyond its purview. For a general discussion of these
problems and proposals to aid in distinguishing between these concepts, see Martha S.
Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L REv. 469, 472 (1988) and
Hofer, supra note 12, at 235.
127. When used in this manner, findings of fact are basic facts or historical facts as
contrasted with inferred facts or ultimate facts. See ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 60.
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1. Judicial Findings of Fact and Jury Verdicts
As a general matter, basic findings of fact made by a trial
court,128 or by a jury, 129 are binding on the appellate court unless
those findings are not supported by competent evidence. 13°
Competent evidence is admissible evidence.'3' This is an extremely
deferential standard of review. Utilization of such a deferential
standard is well founded. The tribunal that is present when
testimony is given is in a better position to evaluate the evidence
than an appellate court reading a cold record. 32 An appellate court
cannot judge a witness's demeanor, conviction or veracity.
Credibility determinations are left for the trial court.1 Thus,
because of these policy considerations, courts are willing to defer,
to a large extent, to the lower body's findings of fact. Thus,
appellate review of a trial court's findings of fact or a jury's
findings of fact is governed by the competent evidence standard of
review.' 4
The scope of review would be broad in determining whether the
facts are supported by competent evidence. Review of the entire
record for evidence would be required to make this determination.
128. See Triffin v. Dillabough, 716 A.2d 605 (Pa. 1998); Thatcher's Drug Store, Inc. v.
Consol. Supermarkets, Inc., 636 A.2d 156 (Pa. 1994); Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d
1096 (Pa. 1985); In re Eshelman's Estate, 89 A2d 775 (Pa. 1952).
129. See In re Kaufmann's Estate, 127 A. 133 (Pa. 1924) and Warehime v. Warehime, 761
Ak2d 1138 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., concurring) (factual findings are to be reviewed on a
deferential basis so long as they are supported by the evidence). See also Burbage v. Boiler
Eng'g & Supply Co., 249 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1969) (appellate court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the fact-finding jury if sufficient evidence in the record exists to support the jury's
findings of fact). Interestingly, the Burbage court continued to opine that it would not set
aside the findings of fact of the jury implicit in its verdict for which there was evidentiary
support and where there was no abuse of discretion or error of law. In utilizing this
amalgam of standards, the court most likely was attempting to describe the standards
applicable to a jury's legal conclusions rather than its findings of fact.
130. See also Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 A2d 879 (Pa. 1998) (suppression court's
findings of facts are binding if those findings are supported by the record).
131. BLACK's LAw DCTIONARY 257 (5th ed. 1979).
132. In re Meyers (Girsh Trust), 189 A.2d 852, 859-60 (Pa. 1963).
133. Id.
134. A notable exception to this standard is the supreme court's review of disciplinary
matters. The supreme court's review is de novo both as to determinations of fact and
determinations of law. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 749 A.2d 441 (Pa. 2000).
Also, such is not the case for inferred or ultimate facts. If facts are a deduction from other
facts and the ultimate fact in question is purely a result of reasoning, then the review is de
novo. That is to say that the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions from the basic
facts as they are applied to law. See Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A2d 385 (Pa.
1986).
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2. Administrative Agency Findings of Fact
The factual findings by an administrative agency in Pennsylvania
are reviewed based upon a substantial evidence standard, as
required by statute. 135 Substantial evidence has been defined as
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." 136 Thus, if the findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence, they are conclusive upon
review. It is not the appellate role to reweigh the evidence or
review the credibility of the witnesses, but to determine whether
the referee's findings have the requisite measure of support in the
record. 137
The scope of review is broad, as an appellate court can use any
evidence in its consideration of support for the lower tribunal's
findings of fact.13
B. Legal Determinations
1. Judicial Legal Determinations
Decisions of law are freely reviewable by Pennsylvania appellate
courts. Appellate courts are not only entitled to review a lower
court's conclusions of law without restraint, they have a duty to do
so.139 Errors of law take different forms. A court may misinterpret a
statute, apply an incorrect legal standard to facts, or improperly
apply an appropriate standard to facts. The appellate court engages
in consideration of the particular legal issue before it without
deference to the lower tribunal's conclusions. 140 Thus, legal
questions are reviewed anew by the appellate court. In this de novo
review, the court steps into the shoes of the lower court and
re-decides the issue. If the appellate court reaches the same
decision as the lower tribunal, the legal determination is affirmed.
If the appellate court comes to a different conclusion than that
reached by the lower court, the legal determination is reversed.
Legal determinations can include constitutional interpretation and
application, statutory interpretation and application, and the grant
or denial of summary judgment or judgment notwithstanding the
135. 2 PA CONS. STAT. § 704 (1995).
136. Peak v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 501 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa.
1985) (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 480 A.2d 382, 386 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984)).
137. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. WCAB, 612 A-2d 434, 437 (Pa. 1992).
138. Id.
139. See Triffin v. Dillabough, 716 A.2d 605 (Pa. 1998).
140. See Banks Eng'g Co. v. Polons, 697 A.2d 1020 (Pa Super. Ct. 1997).
2001
Duquesne Law Review
verdict. In Pennsylvania, the term most frequently applied to
describe the degree of deference to be accorded a lower court's
conclusions of law is "plenary.""4 This term has been deemed to be
synonymous with de novo review which is commonly used at the
federal level. 42 For purposes of this article, the terms de novo and
plenary can and should be used interchangeably.'13
A plenary standard of review is entirely proper with respect to
review of errors of law. Appellate courts are law courts and are
deemed to be experts in the law. Moreover, the high court of a
state is generally considered to be the final word on matters of
state law. Thus, with respect to legal determinations, an appellate
court should and must be able to reverse lower court legal
determinations without deference or reservation. Compared to
facts, which are particular to the parties and case, legal
pronouncements transcend the case and are universally applicable.
As a practical matter, the appellant who can legitimately present
his or her claim as an error of law enjoys the least deference to the
decision below and the best chance for success on appeal. With
respect to pure questions of law, there are no real materials to be
reviewed, but merely the law to discern, and, thus, no necessary
statement of the scope of review. For the application of the law to
particular facts, the scope of review is generally broad in that the
appellate court will review the entire record presented to the lower
tribunal to determine if the lower court erred as a matter of law.
However, this would be issue specific.'4
Mixed questions of fact and law raise a unique issue as to the
appropriate standard of review. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has acknowledged the concept of mixed questions of fact and
law.14 Recently, Justice Saylor noted that the Pennsylvania high
141. See Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 A.2d 879 (Pa. 1998) (conclusions of law are
subject to plenary review). See also Phillips v. A-Best Prod. Co., 665 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1995). In
Phillips, as well as in numerous other decisions, plenary has been utilized to describe the
standard of review as that term is understood in this article. However, in Phillips, as well as
in numerous other decisions, it has been labeled the scope of review. For purposes of
consistency, this article recommends that the term plenary be used to describe the degree of
deference a reviewing court gives to a lower court's conclusions of law.
142. See Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., concurring) (legal
conclusions are subject to de novo review); Commonwealth v. Nester, 709 A.2d at 881
(whether a statement was voluntary is a question of law reviewed de novo) (citing United
States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1996)).
143. See ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 72 (explaining that review of legal determinations is
plenary, and often called de novo review).
144. See Morrison v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 646 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1994).
145. See Warehime v. Warehime, 761 A2d 1138 (Pa. 2000).
Vol. 39:513
Standards and Scopes of Review
court has not given a "universal" standard of review that would be
applicable to these types of determinations. 46 However, he noted
two possible standards that have been applied to mixed questions
of law and fact. First, Justice Saylor offered a deferential approach
that applies an abuse of discretion or lack of supporting evidence
standard.147  Alternatively, other case law recognizes a less
deferential standard, that of de novo review.' 48 However, Justice
Saylor opined that these divergent views on the appropriate
standard could be attributed to the variance among individual
cases; that is, whether legal aspects predominate or are subordinate
to factual aspects.4 9 Indeed, a spectrum of review for these types
of decisions has been suggested, depending upon the tipping of the
analytical scale to fact or law.5° Needless to say, the applicable
standard of review in mixed questions of fact and law is in a state
of flux. As a practical matter, until the Supreme Court offers
additional guidance, counsel will be well advised to advocate the
standard of review that benefits him or her the most on appeal.
2. Administrative Agency Legal Determinations
The Administrative Agency Law permits a court to reverse a
determination by an administrative agency if it is not in accordance
with law.'5 ' This "in accordance with law" standard "is to establish
limited appellate review of agency conclusions to ensure that they
are adequately supported by competent factual findings, are free
from arbitrary or capricious decision making, and, to the extent
relevant, represent a proper exercise of the agency's discretion." 152
Thus, it remains within the reviewing court's "purview to review
the agency's conclusions to determine 'if a reasonable mind might
make the same determination based on the evidence before [it].'"''
However, the review of an administrative agency's conclusions of
law has been held to be plenary.' While these two descriptions of
the standard of review are associated with determinations of law,
146. Id.
147. See Mars Area Sch. Dist. v. United Presbyterian Women's Ass'n, 721 A.2d 360, 361
(Pa. 1998).
148. See City of Chester v. Dep't of Transp., 434 A.2d 695, 699 (Pa. 1981).
149. See generaUy Commonwealth v. Santiago, 654 A.2d 1062, 1072 (Pa. Super. 1994).
150. Id.
151. 2 PA- CONS. STAT. § 704 (1995).
152. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 735 A.2d 96,
98 (Pa. 1999); accord Vista Int'l Hotel v. WCAB, 742 A.2d 649 (Pa. 1999).
153. Id. at 100 (quoting Williams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 327 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. 1974)).
154. See Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. WCAB, 762 A.2d 328 (Pa, 2000).
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and appear to be at odds with each other, they are most likely
addressing two different aspects of that type of determination.
Specifically, with respect to pure errors of law, for example,
statutory interpretation, a plenary review will be appropriate. With
respect to mixed questions, a more deferential standard may
apply.155 Legal determinations made by an administrative agency are
subject to a broad scope of review.
C. Discretionary Determinations
1. Judicial Discretionary Determinations
Decisions involving discretion arise due to the presence of legal
matters upon which a tribunal must render a judgment while "on
the scene" at trial.156 Discretionary decision making arises typically
in trial supervision and admission of evidence determinations.
15 7
Discretionary determinations made by lower tribunals are reviewed
according to an abuse of discretion standard. Discretion connotes
choice and a range of acceptable conclusions with respect to a
legal issue. Thus, unlike the right/wrong determination made under
a de novo review, an abuse of discretion standard is deferential
and accepts a range of conclusions even if an appellate court may
have reached a different conclusion. 58 Consistent with this
understanding of discretion, Pennsylvania courts have described
abuse of discretion as follows:
[A]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because the
appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
requires a showing of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support as to be
clearly erroneous. 59
155. Similarly, in the case of agency discretionary action, an abuse of discretion
standard would apply. See Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 747 A.2d 887,
891 n.6 (Pa. 2000) (appellate review of whether an agency decision is in accordance with law
may include, as a component, consideration of whether the agency's determination
represents an abuse of discretion) (citing Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Bd., 735 k2d 96, 99 (Pa. 1999)).
156. See Davis, supra note 10, at 49.
157. See id. at 50.
158. Again, while beyond the parameters of this article, a great deal of ambiguity exists
as to the deference to be accorded a trial court in making discretionary decisions and how
such a standard should be applied. See generally Davis, supra note 10; Maurice Rosenberg,
Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L REv. 635 (1971);
Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY W. 747 (1982).
159. See Paden v. Baker Concrete Constr., 658 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. 1995).
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Thus, although not entitled to the deference accorded findings of
fact, discretionary decisions by trial courts are reviewed by a less
rigorous standard than decisions of law. The scope of review in
discretionary decision making is generally broad, but the scope will
be issue specific. As noted above, the granting of a new trial is
subject to a narrow scope of review.' 60
2. Administrative Agency Discretionary Determinations
Discretionary acts by an administrative agency are subject to an
abuse of discretion standard under the rubric of an "in accordance
with law" limitation on appellate review.' 6' Thus, the same criteria
used for gauging trial court utilization of discretion would apply to
discretionary determinations made by an administrative agency.' 62
Again, the scope of review would generally be broad, but would be
issue specific.
CONCLUSION
The concepts of standard of review and scope of review have
great importance in the appellate process. However, these terms
are a challenge to define as well as to apply. While the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has supplied a clear definition of these
terms, the meaning of these terms beyond the specific contexts,
addressed by the court has been difficult to ascertain. By defining
the standard of review as the level of deference to be accorded a
lower court decision, and the scope of review to connote what
legal reasoning or materials a reviewing court may use and the
light in which those materials are to be viewed, a more universal
understanding and usage of these terms can be achieved. Appellate
advocates are urged to follow a three-part statement to frame the
appropriate standard and scope of review. By stating the limitations
on the issues a court may consider, followed by the appropriate
standard of review, and finishing with an expression of the scope
of review, both the bench and the bar will benefit from a greater
understanding and a more efficient application of these terms and
will be aided in the appellate process.
160. See Morrison v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 646 A.2d 565 (Pa. 1994).
161. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 735 A.2d 96
(Pa. 1999); Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. Civil Serv. Conm'n, 747 Ak2d 887, 891 n.6 (Pa.
2000).
162. See Fraternal Order of Police v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 735 A2d 96
(Pa. 1999); Pennsylvania Game Comnim'n v. Civil Serv. Comrn'n, 747 A-2d 887, 891 n.6 (Pa.
2000).
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